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CASES NOTED
BULK TRANSFER: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN §ALE OF GOODS
AND SALE OF SERVICES
The plaintiff sold the entire corporate stock of a restaurant. The
purchaser executed a promissory note in favor of the plaintiff, which
was secured by the corporate stock held in escrow under a pledge
agreement. The purchaser subsequently sold the corporate stock to a
buyer who expressly assumed the promissory note obligation. The
entire assets of the restaurant were thereafter resold on three different
occasions. The last two purchasers expressly refused to assume the
obligation represented by the promissory note. The defendant was the
final purchaser of the assets. When the promissory note became delinquent, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant, among others.
The trial court entered an order in favor of the plaintiff on the note.
The defendant appealed, arguing that he could not be held liable for
an obligation that he did not assume. The plaintiff argued that the
bulk transfer provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code' applied to
the purchase of the assets and that, as a creditor of defendant's remote
transferor, he was entitled to the statutory protection. 2 The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held, reversed and remanded: The
sale of a restaurant, a business whose principal function is to provide
services, is not subject to the Florida Bulk Transfer Act. De La Rosa
v. Tropical Sandwiches, Inc., 298 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). 3
Florida Statute, section 676.102 defines the scope of the Bulk
Transfer Act:
(1) A "bulk transfer" is any transfer in bulk and not in the
ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major part of
the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory. 4
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 676.101 et seq. (1973).

2. The Florida Bulk Transfer Act imposes significant responsibilities on the transferee of
the assets of a business. FLA. STAT. § 676.104 (1973) requires the transferee to obtain a schedule
of property transferred, together with a list of the transferor's creditors. The schedule must be

made available to creditors of the transferor.
FLA. STAT. § 676.105 (1973) requires the transferee to notify the creditors of the proposed

transfer at least 10 days prior to sale.
FLA. STAT. § 676.106 (1973) requires the transferee to insure that the proceeds of the sale are
applied to payment of the debts of the transferor. The inclusion of this optional provision is a
major departure from the pre-Code Florida Bulk Sales Act. REV. GEN. STAT. §§ 3865 et seq.

(1920).
The sections cited above provide that transfers of inventory and equipment, subject to, but
not in compliance with the provisions of this chapter, are ineffective against any creditor of the
transferor. Any such creditor could disregard the transfer and levy on the goods as still belonging
to the transferor.
3. Hereinafter referred to as De La Rosa.
4. FLA. STAT. § 679.109(4) (1973) defines inventory as goods "held by a person who holds
them for sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service ... .

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

'[Vol. XXIX

(2) A transfer of a substantial part of the equipment of such
an enterprise is a bulk transfer if it is made in connection
with a bulk transfer of inventory, but not otherwise. 5
(3) The enterprises subject to this chapter are all those whose
principal business is the sale of merchandise from stock,
including those who marfufacture what they sell.
In reaching its decision, the Third District relied on the Official
Comments:
The businesses covered . . . do not include farming or
contracting nor professional services, nor such things as
cleaning shops, barber shops, pool halls, hotels, restaurants
and the like whose principal
business is the sale not of mer6
chandise but of services.
The transfers included are of "materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory" that is, of goods . . . I
• . . they [the included businesses] are8 believed to be
those that carry the major bulk sales risks.
Article 6 of the U.C.C. was drafted to protect creditors from
merchant debtors who would sell out their stock-in-trade, often at a
price well below fair market value, then pocket the proceeds and
disappear, leaving their creditors unpaid. 9 At common law, prior to
the passage of the various state bulk sales acts, creditors had no
recourse against the buyer in such cases unless they could show that
the buyer had a fraudulent intent. "Fraudulent intent" was established
by showing actual or constructive knowlege on the buyer's part of the
intended fraud as to the seller's creditors. In many instances, this
proved impossible and creditors were left without a remedy. ' The
drafters of Article 6 noted that while there may be some bulk sales risk
in the excluded enterprises, generally it can be said that unsecured
credit is not commonly extended in reliance on the assets of the
excluded businesses. I I
De La Rosa is the first Florida decision to consider the scope of
the present Florida Bulk Transfer Act.12 In this decision the court
embraced the distinction between "sales" enterprises and "service"
enterprises. Those businesses engaged in the sale of goods from stock
5. This equipment provision is very important, especially in situations similar to that
presented in the instant case, where one can expect the value of equipment to greatly exceed the
value of any inventory transferred. The creditor of the transferor can reach the equipment by
arguing that its transfer was accompanied by a transfer of the inventory.
6. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 676.6-102, Comment 2 (1973).
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 676.6-102, Comment 3 (1973).
8. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 676.6-102, Comment 4 (1973).
9. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 676.6-101, Comment 2 (1973).
10. Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic Adjustment, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 72, 80
(1928).
I]. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 676.6-102, Comment 2 (1973).
12. FLA. STAT. §§ 676.101 et seq. (1973).
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were deemed subject to the provisions of the Act, while enterprises
engaged in the furnishing of services were not.
The court noted that a similar result would have obtained under
the pre-code Florida Bulk Sales Law. 13 The court cited Atlas Rock Co.
v. Miami Beach Builders Supply Co., 14 which dealt with the sale of
certain assets of a construction company, namely, a towboat, a barge,
rock crushers and piles of rock. The creditor of the transferor argued
that the transferee had failed to comply with the Florida Bulk Sales
Law and that the sale, as to him, was therefore ineffective. The
Supreme Court of Florida held that the sale of a construction company
was not subject to the Act, as the transferor was neither a wholesale
nor a retail merchant. The court placed considerable emphasis on
certain language in the statute itself, which at least implied that the Act
dealt with wholesale or retail businesses only. 15 The court's decision in
Atlas, although not enunciating the sale of goods/sale of services distinction, does indicate that the prior statute was aimed at the same
problem with which the drafters of Article 6 were concerned, i.e. the
defrauding of creditors of wholesale and retail merchants.
Florida's early Bulk Sales Act was not unlike those adopted in
other states. Despite the wide variety of language utilized in the
various state bulk sales statutes, most acts apparently applied to
both retail and wholesale businesses.16 But unless specifically included, the transfer of restaurants was generally deemed not to be
subject to the bulk sales acts.
The principal rationale utilized by the courts in excluding such
transfers from the purview of the acts was that the value of restaurant
inventory was typically so low due to the perishable nature of the stock
that it was unlikely that any credit was extended in reliance thereon. 17
Although the question of the applicability of Article 6 of the
Uniform Commercial Code to the transfer of restaurants has been
extensively litigated outside of Florida, those courts which have considered the question have generally reached the same result as De La
Rosa. In Kane-Miller Corp. v. Tip Tree Corp., 18 a New York court
relied on the language of U.C.C. section 6-102(3) and the Official
Comments thereto in holding that the sale of a restaurant, hotel and
taproom was beyond the reach of Article 6. Regretably, the court
13. FLA. STAT. §§ 726.01 et
14. 89 Fla. 340, 103 So. 615
15. The court referred to the
REv. GEN. STAT. §§ 3865 et seq.

seq. (1953).
(1925).
language of the early versiofi of the Florida Bulk Sales Act,
(1920) which required compliance with the Act, regardless of

whether the vendor was a "wholesale or retail merchant." The Act was subsequently amended,
ch. 22858, § 7, [1945] Fla. Laws 860, but retained the language relied upon by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Atlas Rock Co. v. Miami Beach Builders Supply Co., 89 Fla. 340, 103 So.
615 (1925).
16. Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Businesses Included, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 9, 14.
17. Id. at 16.
18. 60 Misc. 2d 776, 303 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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offered little in the way of analysis to justify its decision. SilcoAutomatic Vending Co., Inc. v. Howell, 19 offered considerably more
analysis. There, a New Jersey court held that the sale of a tavern was
not subject to the state's bulk transfer provisions. 2" The court, citing
the Official Comments to Article 6, noted that the bulk transfer provisions applied only to those enterprises whose principal business was
the sale of merchandise from stock. The court did not, however, rest
its decision entirely on that observation. It placed great weight on the
fact that, in this particular sale, the inventory sold accounted for only
$185.73, out of a total sales price of $16,738.23. Thus, the court felt
that
[t]he nature of the transactions under examination here establish beyond peradventure that plaintiff at no time relied upon
the inventory of Al's Cozy Inn, Inc. when it either entered
into the agreement in 2question or advanced the loan under
the second agreement. '
The decision was ultimately based on this "value of inventory" factor;
since the creditor had not extended credit in reliance on inventory, he
was in no way prejudiced by the transfer of that inventory.
Pennsylvania is the only state which applies Article 6 to the
transfer of a restaurant without a specific statutory provision. 22 In Uhr
v. 3361, Inc., 23 the court held that the sale of a restaurant and
taproom business violated Pennsylvania's bulk sales law. 24 The court
offered little analysis; instead, it relied excusively on two earlier trial
court decisions; Stein v. Goldberg25 and Brooks v. Lambert.2 6 However, a close reading of these two cases reveals that the Uhr court's
reliance may have been nisplaced. Stein was actually decided under
the pre-Code Pennsylvania Bulk Sales Act, 27 a statute so worded as to
19. 102 N.J. Super. 243, 245 A.2d 765 (Super. Ct. 1968) [hereinafter referred to as Silco].
20. New Jersey adopted the official version of Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code

without modification. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A: 6-101 et seq. (1962).
21. Silco-Automatic Vending Co., Inc. v. Howell, 102 N.J. Super. 243, 250, 245 A.2d 765,
769 (Super. Ct. 1968).
22. Certain other states, in enacting Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code, have
modified that Article so as to bring restaurants and other "service" businesses within the reach of
the Code. California modified the language of U.C.C. section 6-102(3) to achieve this result: "The
enterprises subject to this division are all those whose principal business is that of a baker, cafe or
restaurant owner, garage owner, cleaner or dyer, or retail or wholesale merchant." Cal. Comm.
Code § 6102(3) (West 1964).

The legislatures of Idaho, Oregon and Washington have also specifically included restaurants
among those enterprises subject to the bulk transfer provisions. The existence of such statutory
modifications exhibit legislative acknowledgment that the original Article 6 provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code do not reach restaurants. Nevertheless the Pennsylvania Statutes,
sections 6-101 et seq. (1974), contain no such modifications.
23. 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 348 (Phila. County Ct. 1960).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-101 et seq. (1953).

25. 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 562 (Phila. County Ct. 1954) [hereinafter referred to as Stein].
26. 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 237 (Del. City Ct. 1956) [hereinafter referred to as Brooks].
27. No. 97 [19391 Pa. Laws 189-90 (repealed). The current Pennsylvania Act is PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 6-101 et seq. (1954).
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include the transfer or sale of goods, wares, fixtures or merchandise of
any kind. While the Brooks case was decided under Article 6 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Pennsylvania, the court
relied on case law developed under the earlier Pennsylvania statute.
The importance of the changes in statutory language was noted in
another Pennsylvania decision which strongly suggested that the restricted language of the new Pennsylvania statute would exclude the
transfer of restaurants from those enterprises subject to the bulk transfer provisions. 2 8
In the usual case, the sale of goods/sale of services distinction is an
adequate test by which to determine the applicability of the bulk
transfer statute. Some businesses clearly sell services, not goods. 2 9
However, other businesses do not fit clearly into either category. Some
businesses are simultaneously engaged in the sale of goods from stock
and the sale of services. 30 The De La Rosa decision offers the Florida
practitioner little assistance in predicting when the sale of such a
business will require compliance with the statute. 3 1 Courts, when
dealing with businesses which fall into this gray area, may profitably
adopt the following two step analysis: (1) Is the business engaged in the
sale of merchandise from stock? This is essentially a question of fact.
(2) Did the creditors advance funds in reliance on the inventory? In
answering this question, note should be taken of the value of the
transferred inventory. If it is relatively small, especially when compared to the size of the loan, there should be a presumption that the
creditors did not so rely. 32 An affirmative answer to both questions
indicates that the transaction should fall within the scope of the bulk sales
act.
The adoption of this "sale of goods/reliance on inventory" analysis
has the advantage of dealing with the specific problem to which both
the Code and the original bulk transfer acts were addressed, i.e., that
debtors would make a bad faith transfer of inventory on which their
creditors had relied in extending credit. The adoption of this approach
would result in the development of case law effectuating the stated
intentions of the drafters, while at the same time reasonably limiting
the reach of the Act.
THEODORE R. DEMPSTER
28. Miskeiel v. Hide-Away Hut Inc., 12 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 756 (Pa. 1963).
29. See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Rogers, 300 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (a beauty salon,
unless primarily engaged in selling cosmetics, would be a purely lervice type enterprise and
therefore not subject to bulk transfer laws).
30. Among such businesses are auto repair garages which sell and install parts, and marine
repair and outfitting businesses which build and repair boats. Both businesses carry large
inventories of parts, which they sell; however, at the same time, they provide important services.
31. Although the court in De La Rosa held this restaurant to be engaged in the sale of
services, it should be noted that the U.C.C. as adopted by Florida, indicates that food falls
within the definition of goods. FLA. STAT. §672.105(1)(1973). Additionally, FLA. STAT. § 672.314(1)
(1973) implies that the sale of food is a sale of goods.
32. See Silco-Automatic Vending Co., Inc. v. Howell, 102 N.J. Super. 243, 245 A.2d 765
(1968); for further information see notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.

